fix(security): implement comprehensive input validation

- Add is_valid_username() function to prevent injection attacks
  * Reject shell metacharacters: |;&$`<>(){}[]'"\
  * Reject control characters (except tab)
  * Reject usernames starting with space, dot, or dash
- Apply username validation in read_username() with fallback to "anonymous"
- Add rate limiting via sleep(1) on validation failure
- Sanitize message content in message_save():
  * Replace pipe, newline, carriage return to prevent log injection
  * Ensure null termination of sanitized strings
- Enhance message_load() validation:
  * Check for oversized lines
  * Validate field lengths before copying
  * Validate timestamp reasonableness (not >1 day future, <10 years past)
  * Ensure null termination of all loaded strings

These changes address:
- Username injection vulnerabilities
- Message content injection in log files
- Log file format corruption attacks
- Malformed timestamp handling

Prevents:
- Command injection via usernames
- Log poisoning attacks
- DoS via oversized messages

src/message.c

@@ -48,6 +48,13 @@ int message_load(message_t **messages, int max_messages) {
 
     /* Now read the messages */
     while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), fp) && count < max_messages) {
+        /* Check for oversized lines */
+        size_t line_len = strlen(line);
+        if (line_len >= sizeof(line) - 1) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "Warning: Skipping oversized line in messages.log\n");
+            continue;
+        }
+
         /* Format: RFC3339_timestamp|username|content */
         char line_copy[2048];
         strncpy(line_copy, line, sizeof(line_copy) - 1);
@@ -57,10 +64,19 @@ int message_load(message_t **messages, int max_messages) {
         char *username = strtok(NULL, "|");
         char *content = strtok(NULL, "\n");
 
+        /* Validate all fields exist */
         if (!timestamp_str || !username || !content) {
             continue;
         }
 
+        /* Validate field lengths */
+        if (strlen(username) >= MAX_USERNAME_LEN) {
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (strlen(content) >= MAX_MESSAGE_LEN) {
+            continue;
+        }
+
         /* Parse ISO 8601 timestamp */
         struct tm tm = {0};
         char *result = strptime(timestamp_str, "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S", &tm);
@@ -68,9 +84,19 @@ int message_load(message_t **messages, int max_messages) {
             continue;
         }
 
-        msg_array[count].timestamp = mktime(&tm);
+        /* Validate timestamp is reasonable (not in far future or past) */
+        time_t msg_time = mktime(&tm);
+        time_t now = time(NULL);
+        if (msg_time > now + 86400 || msg_time < now - 31536000 * 10) {
+            /* Skip messages more than 1 day in future or 10 years in past */
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        msg_array[count].timestamp = msg_time;
         strncpy(msg_array[count].username, username, MAX_USERNAME_LEN - 1);
+        msg_array[count].username[MAX_USERNAME_LEN - 1] = '\0';
         strncpy(msg_array[count].content, content, MAX_MESSAGE_LEN - 1);
+        msg_array[count].content[MAX_MESSAGE_LEN - 1] = '\0';
         count++;
     }
 
@@ -92,8 +118,30 @@ int message_save(const message_t *msg) {
     gmtime_r(&msg->timestamp, &tm_info);
     strftime(timestamp, sizeof(timestamp), "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ", &tm_info);
 
+    /* Sanitize username and content to prevent log injection */
+    char safe_username[MAX_USERNAME_LEN];
+    char safe_content[MAX_MESSAGE_LEN];
+
+    strncpy(safe_username, msg->username, sizeof(safe_username) - 1);
+    safe_username[sizeof(safe_username) - 1] = '\0';
+
+    strncpy(safe_content, msg->content, sizeof(safe_content) - 1);
+    safe_content[sizeof(safe_content) - 1] = '\0';
+
+    /* Replace pipe characters and newlines to prevent log format corruption */
+    for (char *p = safe_username; *p; p++) {
+        if (*p == '|' || *p == '\n' || *p == '\r') {
+            *p = '_';
+        }
+    }
+    for (char *p = safe_content; *p; p++) {
+        if (*p == '|' || *p == '\n' || *p == '\r') {
+            *p = ' ';
+        }
+    }
+
     /* Write to file: timestamp|username|content */
-    fprintf(fp, "%s|%s|%s\n", timestamp, msg->username, msg->content);
+    fprintf(fp, "%s|%s|%s\n", timestamp, safe_username, safe_content);
 
     fclose(fp);
     return 0;

src/ssh_server.c

@@ -17,6 +17,33 @@
 /* Global SSH bind instance */
 static ssh_bind g_sshbind = NULL;
 
+/* Validate username to prevent injection attacks */
+static bool is_valid_username(const char *username) {
+    if (!username || username[0] == '\0') {
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    /* Reject usernames starting with special characters */
+    if (username[0] == ' ' || username[0] == '.' || username[0] == '-') {
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    /* Check for illegal characters that could cause injection */
+    const char *illegal_chars = "|;&$`\n\r<>(){}[]'\"\\";
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < strlen(username); i++) {
+        /* Reject control characters (except tab) */
+        if (username[i] < 32 && username[i] != 9) {
+            return false;
+        }
+        /* Reject shell metacharacters */
+        if (strchr(illegal_chars, username[i])) {
+            return false;
+        }
+    }
+
+    return true;
+}
+
 /* Generate or load SSH host key */
 static int setup_host_key(ssh_bind sshbind) {
     struct stat st;
@@ -178,9 +205,18 @@ static int read_username(client_t *client) {
         strcpy(client->username, "anonymous");
     } else {
         strncpy(client->username, username, MAX_USERNAME_LEN - 1);
-        /* Truncate to 20 characters */
+        client->username[MAX_USERNAME_LEN - 1] = '\0';
-        if (utf8_strlen(client->username) > 20) {
+
-            utf8_truncate(client->username, 20);
+        /* Validate username for security */
+        if (!is_valid_username(client->username)) {
+            client_printf(client, "Invalid username. Using 'anonymous' instead.\r\n");
+            strcpy(client->username, "anonymous");
+            sleep(1);  /* Slow down rapid retry attempts */
+        } else {
+            /* Truncate to 20 characters */
+            if (utf8_strlen(client->username) > 20) {
+                utf8_truncate(client->username, 20);
+            }
         }
     }